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•  The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has revived the question 
of whether monetary policy should and could do 
more to restrain a buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
•  Effective supervision and regulation are the ﬁ  rst 
line of defence against ﬁ  nancial imbalances. An 
important question is whether they should be the 
only one. Moreover, the interaction between such 
prudential policies and monetary policy could have 
important implications for the appropriate use of 
both kinds of policy.
•  This article argues that the case for monetary 
policy to lean against ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
  depends on the sources of the shock or market 
failure and on the nature of the other regulatory 
instruments available.
•  To the extent that ﬁ  nancial imbalances are speciﬁ  c 
to a sector or market and that a well-targeted 
prudential tool is available, monetary policy may 
play a minor role in leaning against the imbalances. 
However, if the imbalances in a speciﬁ  c market 
can spill over to the entire economy and/or if the 
prudential tool is broad based, it is more likely that 
monetary policy will have a role to play. In such a 
case, there may be a need to coordinate the use of 
the two policy instruments.
T
  he global ﬁ  nancial crisis of 2007–09 serves as a 
  powerful reminder that even the most sophisti-
 cated  ﬁ  nancial systems may be subject to viru-
lent crises that can have a huge impact on the real 
economy. In the recent crisis, the monetary policy 
response was forceful: interest rates were moved 
quickly to historic lows, and unconventional policies 
were implemented in a number of countries. Together 
with ﬁ  scal stimulus and direct support for ﬁ  nancial 
systems in numerous countries, this response was 
effective in “cleaning up” after the crisis had broken—
contributing to the start of an economic recovery and 
creating conditions for rebuilding damaged ﬁ  nancial 
systems. Nonetheless, the economic costs of the 
recession were very large, and many of the policy 
measures themselves had signiﬁ  cant costs.
This experience has renewed attention on crisis pre-
vention. While the main focus has been on strength-
ening ﬁ  nancial supervision and regulation, preventing 
future crises can also be relevant for monetary policy. 
Considering that the vulnerabilities underlying the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis developed against the background of a 
long period of macroeconomic stability raises the 
question of whether a different set of macroeconomic 
policies could have helped to prevent the crisis. The 
experience also gives fresh signiﬁ  cance to an old 
question: should monetary policy, through movements 
in the policy interest rate, seek to counteract ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances such as those associated with asset-price 
bubbles or unsustainable credit expansion? In other 
words, as William White (2009) put it, “Should monetary 
policy lean or clean?” Should it lean against ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances as they are building up, or should its role 
be limited to cleaning up the fallout by mitigating the 
macroeconomic consequences after the imbalances 
unwind?
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used to inform monetary policy decisions in most 
cases explicitly rule out the possibility of crises that 
may occur at an uncertain date.
2 Conversely, con-
ducting inﬂ  ation targeting in the context of a highly 
non-linear model that does capture the possibility of 
bubbles, credit booms, and other imbalances that 
lead to crises would be associated with a different 
focus for monetary policy discussions and might 
require another practical decision-making framework.
In practice, however, taking account of 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances in the context of 
inﬂ  ation targeting could require changes 
in how we think about monetary policy. 
The central question is whether it would be desirable 
to undertake this task. A general concern is that 
giving monetary policy explicit responsibility for ﬁ  nan-
cial stability would result in a lack of clarity regarding 
the objectives of monetary policy, and would possibly 
undermine the credibility of the inﬂ  ation objective. 
Arguably, establishing a single, clear objective is 
critical for monetary policy, because of the importance 
of expectations in determining actual inﬂ  ation. Policy 
credibility cannot be taken for granted, in view of the 
dynamic inconsistency of optimal monetary policy 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). 
It could prove very challenging for a central bank with 
multiple objectives, but only a single instrument, to 
communicate credibly about how it is delivering on its 
responsibility for price stability.
3
Another potentially important cost of leaning against 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances stems from the difﬁ  culty of 
  identifying them and of calibrating an appropriate 
response. If ﬁ  nancial imbalances are falsely identiﬁ  ed, 
responding to them through monetary policy could 
induce undesirable economic ﬂ  uctuations (Greenspan 
2002; Bernanke and Gertler 1999). Moreover, to the 
extent that ﬁ  nancial imbalances are sector-speciﬁ  c, 
monetary policy may be too blunt an instrument for 
addressing them. The interest rate has economy-wide 
consequences for inﬂ  ation and output; tightening 
monetary policy in response to the building up of 
persistent ﬁ  nancial imbalances in one sector could 
2  For instance, the dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models prevalent in macro-
economic analysis incorporate transversality conditions that rule out unsustainable 
movements in prices and other variables, such as asset-price bubbles and debt crises. 
3  See Bank of England Discussion Paper (November 2009) for a recent summary of 
this case.
As the recent crisis has demonstrated, some element 
of cleaning up in the wake of a crisis is unavoidable: 
the central bank’s responsibility for price stability 
dictates that policy is eased in the wake of a crisis 
that may have powerful contractionary effects on 
economic activity and inﬂ  ation. However, systematically 
easing monetary policy after crises creates a policy 
asymmetry that, by inﬂ  uencing expectations, may 
contribute to the buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances. If 
investors expect monetary authorities to ease policy 
in the event of any crash, that expectation may, in 
effect, establish a ﬂ  oor for asset prices, which creates 
incentives for excessive risk taking.
1 Since the central 
bank cannot credibly commit not to clean, it has been 
argued that, to avoid such a policy asymmetry, mon-
etary policy should act pre-emptively to lean against 
the buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances (see White 2009 
for a survey of the literature). It is therefore the desir-
ability of such leaning that has been at the centre of 
the debate and that is the primary focus of this article.
The conventional theoretical framework used to study 
monetary policy—in which social welfare is maximized 
by achieving stable output and low inﬂ  ation—provides 
a direct answer to the question of whether monetary 
policy should respond pre-emptively to ﬁ  nancial sector 
developments to the extent that these developments 
are expected to affect output and inﬂ  ation. In principle, 
this means that, in responding to ﬁ  nancial imbalances, 
the central bank should take into account not only 
their direct effect on output and inﬂ  ation, but also any 
macroeconomic effects that could materialize later 
on, when these imbalances unwind. There is thus no 
inherent inconsistency between inﬂ  ation targeting and 
the use of monetary policy to counteract ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances, provided the time horizon is long and 
ﬂ  exible enough. From this perspective, the lesson 
from the recent crisis is not that we need a different 
policy framework, but that we need better analysis of 
the macroeconomic effects of ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
(Svensson 2002, 2009).
In practice, however, taking account of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances in the context of inﬂ  ation targeting could 
require changes in how we think about monetary 
policy. While monetary policy does include an assess-
ment of the risks around the baseline, the primary 
focus is on the balance of the risks. An emphasis on 
ﬁ  nancial stability, in contrast, focuses on what can be 
done to mitigate the various risks, including those 
associated with low-probability “tail events.” This 
revised way of thinking about monetary policy 
requires different tools. The linear, or linearized, 
1  This type of policy asymmetry is sometimes characterized as “the Greenspan put.”
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driven by self-fulﬁ  lling expectations, which are often 
alluded to in the “lean or clean” debate. Nonetheless, 
these models serve to illustrate a few initial principles 
that are of broader relevance.
Appropriate supervision and regulation 
are the ﬁ  rst line of defence against 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances, the key question 
is whether they should be the only one.
Both examples illustrate that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in countering ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
depends on the nature of the shocks, the inﬂ  uence of 
monetary policy and prudential tools on these imbal-
ances, and the interactions between them. In particular, 
where ﬁ  nancial imbalances reﬂ  ect speciﬁ  c market 
failures and regulatory policies can be targeted directly 
to such failures, monetary policy is less likely to play a 
useful role. Monetary policy will more likely have a 
role to play when ﬁ  nancial imbalances stem from 
economy-wide factors.
Of course, in practice, ﬁ  nancial imbalances in the 
economy may well be associated with a combination 
of factors, and exuberance that is initially contained 
within speciﬁ  c sectors could spread more broadly 
through the economy. That was almost certainly the 
case in the run-up to the 2007–09 crisis, which 
reﬂ  ected the complex interplay of imbalances among 
mortgage markets in the United States and other 
countries, securitized lending markets, credit default 
swaps and other derivatives markets, and the banking 
systems of the United States and some other coun-
tries. Thus, the examples presented here, while 
relevant, should be seen as individual building blocks 
for analyzing the interaction between monetary and 
prudential policies.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, 
the two examples are discussed in detail. Then, more 
general lessons are drawn by comparing these 
examples and highlighting the likely implications of 
two features that are absent from them, i.e., the risk-
taking channel and the fact that ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
are not easily detectable. The ﬁ  nal section ends with 
some conclusions.
force inﬂ  ation to persistently undershoot its target 
(Kohn 2008; Bean 2009; Dale 2009; and Carney 2009). 
As well, any possible role for monetary policy in 
restraining the buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances needs 
to be considered in relation to other available policy 
instruments—in particular, to prudential policies, that 
is, the supervision and regulation of the ﬁ  nancial 
system. While such policies have traditionally focused 
on ensuring the soundness of individual ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and market infrastructure and on the 
integrity of markets, there has recently been greater 
emphasis on a system-wide approach that would 
focus on the stability of the whole ﬁ  nancial system. 
Under this approach, supervision and regulation 
would aim to make the ﬁ  nancial system more robust 
and would lean against the ﬁ  nancial cycle. In the 
aftermath of the recent crisis, promising initiatives 
have been launched to develop a framework for 
system-wide supervision and regulation and to 
upgrade this toolkit. If these initiatives are successful, 
they could obviate, or substantially reduce, the need 
for monetary policy to counteract ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
It has thus been argued that system-wide supervision 
should be the ﬁ  rst line of defence against ﬁ  nancial 
instability (Carney 2009; Bernanke 2010; and Kohn 
2010). But designing and implementing this new 
toolkit is a formidable challenge, and there is con-
siderable uncertainty about what will realistically be 
feasible. While there are many promising proposals on 
the table (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2009)—indeed, this is at the core of the G-20’s 
agenda—much remains to be done.
Granted that appropriate supervision and regulation 
are the ﬁ  rst line of defence against ﬁ  nancial imbalances, 
the key question is whether they should be the only 
one. In this context, developing a view on whether 
monetary policy should lean against ﬁ  nancial imbal-
ances requires that we ﬁ  rst examine the interaction 
between the effects of prudential tools and those of 
monetary policy on ﬁ  nancial imbalances that stem 
from various sources.
In this article, we present two illustrations of these 
interactions. To do so, we explore the role of monetary 
policy in two models in which ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
stem from different sources, for which different pru-
dential tools are available. It is important to note that 
these two examples should be seen merely as useful 
illustrations and by no means as the ﬁ  nal word on the 
relationship between monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances. In particular, the models used examine 
ﬁ  nancial shocks in the context of linear models and 
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ampliﬁ  es the mechanism just described: as house 
prices rise and balance sheets improve, the increased 
demand for housing raises house prices even higher. 
The rise in house prices causes additional improve-
ments in balance sheets, which fuel further increases 
in consumption and housing investment. Any shock 
hitting the economy is thus ampliﬁ  ed through this 
mechanism.
A similar model, estimated using post-1980 Canadian 
aggregate data, captures the relative standard devia-
tions of macroeconomic variables relative to GDP 
(Christensen et al. 2009). An important feature of this 
model is that it captures the correlations between 
consumption and GDP and between consumption 
and house prices that are produced by a reduced-
form vector autoregression. The steady-state level of 
the LTV ratio is set to 0.8.
The model is used to examine the effect of a ﬁ  nancial 
imbalance—characterized as a signiﬁ  cant and sus-
tained deviation of asset prices or ﬁ  nancial indicators 
from longer-run trends—and the appropriate policy 
response.
Two policy tools are available in this model: monetary 
policy and prudential policy. Monetary policy is con-
ducted mainly by following a Taylor rule with interest 
rate smoothing. Such a rule stipulates that the mon-
etary authority adjusts the policy rate in response to 
deviations of the inﬂ  ation rate from a target and output 
from potential (the output gap). When conducting 
policy experiments, an augmented Taylor rule is also 
considered, where the Taylor rule responds to indica-
tors of ﬁ  nancial imbalances (such as a divergence of 
actual household debt from its trend value) in addition 
to inﬂ  ation and the output gap.
The model also allows for the possibility of using the 
prudential instrument, the LTV ratio, in a counter-
cyclical manner. The maximum LTV ratio can be 
lowered when credit rises above its trend value, and 
raised when credit falls below its trend.
Exuberance in the Housing Sector
A credit-fuelled housing bubble is a particularly rel-
evant example of a ﬁ  nancial imbalance. This section 
considers the case of over-exuberance in the housing 
sector, represented as a temporary increase in the 
perceived value of housing that results in a short-term 
surge in mortgage credit.
4 This example is calibrated 
to produce housing-market dynamics that are roughly 
similar to those of the housing market in the United 
States in the run-up to the recent crisis. Speciﬁ  cally, 
the size of the shock is set at 5 per cent of the value of 
housing collateral; this leads to an average increase in 
mortgage debt in the ﬁ  rst year of about 16 per cent, 
comparable with the average annual growth rate of 
mortgage debt over the 2003–06 period.
We evaluate the relative merits of using monetary 
policy to contain this imbalance and compare it with a 
well-targeted prudential instrument—namely, an 
adjustment in the mortgage loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. 
In the policy discussion of counter-cyclical system-
wide prudential tools, several indicators of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances have been suggested, such as debt 
growth, the debt gap (debt relative to trend), the ratio 
of debt to GDP, and asset prices. In this example, the 
LTV ratio can be varied counter-cyclically as a function 
of the aggregate size of debt relative to trend.
The economic environment used, from Christensen 
and Meh (2010) and based on Iacoviello (2005), is a 
standard New Keynesian model with heterogeneous 
agents, where housing equity inﬂ  uences the borrowing 
capacity of households. This class of models is widely 
used in the academic literature and in many policy 
institutions. See, for example, the World Economic 
Outlook for October (International Monetary Fund 
2009). This model implies that house prices have 
macroeconomic effects through the inﬂ  uence of the 
borrowing constraints on consumption.
Intuitively, the ﬁ  nancial sector in this model works as 
follows. The amount that households can borrow is 
constrained by the collateral they can pledge, which 
is tied to housing values. A rise in house prices 
increases the value of the collateral held by house-
holds and improves the state of household balance 
sheets. This improvement increases the amount that 
households can borrow for current consumption and 
for housing investment.
4  A similar strategy is followed by Gertler and Karadi (2010) and Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2010).
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is comparable with the trend rate in the United States 
during the mid-2000s. The effects of this shock on 
output and inﬂ  ation are small because the shock 
affects only a small set of the population (credit- 
constrained borrower households).
The second point is that if, in addition to inﬂ  ation 
and the output gap, the monetary authority reacts 
explicitly to credit conditions, a sharp increase in 
interest rates is required to stem the buildup of credit, 
and this increase will result in a signiﬁ  cant drop in 
inﬂ  ation and output. The high levels of indebtedness 
and interest rates generate a stronger drop in con-
sumption because of the higher cost of servicing the 
debt. Since debt contracts are nominal, this effect is 
also compounded by the debt-deﬂ  ation effect, 
Financial regulation can be more effective 
than monetary policy in addressing 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances
The model is used to highlight the relative merits of 
prudential policy and monetary policy in dealing with 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances. Three main points emerge from 
this policy experiment and are illustrated in Chart 1 
and Chart 2.
The ﬁ  rst point is that if exuberance in the housing 
market is not addressed directly through either policy 
instrument, it does not have a signiﬁ  cant impact on 
inﬂ  ation and output, but does have a large impact on 
household debt. For example, Chart 1 illustrates that 
after a 5 per cent shock to collateral, inﬂ  ation and 
output barely change, even though mortgage debt 
Chart 1:  Effects of a positive 5 per cent shock to housing collateral with no counter-cyclical LTV ratio
Percentage deviation from steady state
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counter-cyclical regulatory policy, and monetary policy 
follows the simple Taylor rule. As the chart illustrates, 
compared with a monetary policy targeted to achieve 
a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancial-stability objective, a counter-cyclical 
LTV ratio on its own achieves the same dampening of 
mortgage debt, with fewer adverse effects on inﬂ  ation 
and output. The decrease in the LTV ratio in this scen-
ario is up to 2 per cent, suggesting that the greater 
the adjustment to the LTV, the less monetary policy 
needs to raise the interest rate and the less inﬂ  ation 
will undershoot the target.
This example suggests that when ﬁ  nancial imbal-
ances come from a speciﬁ  c sector (e.g., housing), 
regulation targeted to that sector can be effective, 
while leaning with monetary policy would generate 
because inﬂ  ation unexpectedly falls below target. 
This can be seen in Chart 1, where the LTV ratio is 
assumed to be ﬁ  xed, whereas monetary policy reacts 
explicitly to deviations of credit from its trend value. In 
this illustration, dampening the expansion of mortgage 
debt to 10 per cent above trend comes at the cost of 
a decrease in output and inﬂ  ation of up to 1.3 per cent 
and 0.5 per cent, respectively. This illustrates the idea 
that monetary policy might be too blunt a tool to stem 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances emerging in a speciﬁ  c sector (as 
stressed, for instance, in Bank of England 2009).
The third point is that a prudential policy in the form of 
a counter-cyclical LTV ratio is effective in addressing 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances in the housing market without 
resulting in larger, and persistent, undershooting of 
the inﬂ  ation target, and with less impact on economic 
Chart 2:  Effects of a positive 5 per cent shock to housing collateral with a counter-cyclical LTV ratio present
Percentage deviation from steady state
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ation process is complicated by two sources of moral 
hazard. The ﬁ  rst affects the relationship between 
banks and ﬁ  rms and arises because ﬁ  rms may not 
exert an optimal level of effort, since effort is costly 
and not publicly observable. To mitigate this problem, 
banks can monitor the behaviour of ﬁ  rms and require 
that they invest their own funds in projects.
The second source of moral hazard pertains to the 
relationship between banks and investors and stems 
from the fact that banks (to which dispersed investors 
delegate the monitoring of ﬁ  rms) may not monitor with 
optimal intensity, since monitoring is costly and is not 
publicly observable. In response, investors will provide 
loanable funds only to banks that are well capitalized. 
All things being equal, a higher level of bank capital 
lessens the moral-hazard problem between banks 
and investors and increases the ability of banks to 
attract loanable funds.
In the model, banks hold capital both to mitigate these 
agency problems and to satisfy a regulatory capital 
requirement (see Christensen, Meh, and Moran 2010). 
This capital requirement can be time varying and 
adjusted counter-cyclically with bank-credit conditions. 
Raising new bank capital is costly, however, and this 
implies that, in the short run, bank capital is determined 
mainly by earnings. In the model, the overall effects of 
shocks depend on the relative amount of bank capital 
and on the net worth of ﬁ  rms.
Monetary policy is conducted following a Taylor-type 
rule, as in the previous example. But the ﬁ  nancial 
variable to which monetary policy could react is 
related to a persistent deviation from the trend of bank 
business credit. An exogenous monetary policy, 
where the nominal interest rate is held constant in the 
face of the temporary shock to the banking sector, is 
also considered.
Financial imbalances are represented by an increase 
in the perceived quality of the assets of ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediaries (see Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010). Referred to 
as bank-capital shocks, these lead to an increase in 
the capital positions of banks, which, in turn, generate 
a rise in bank lending and a fall in credit spreads (such 
as occurred in the mid-2000s). The size of the shock 
is set at a 5 per cent rise in bank capital to replicate 
the magnitude of lending and credit spreads during 
the mid-2000s.
Three ﬁ  ndings arise from this example. The ﬁ  rst is that 
exuberance in the banking sector, in the absence of a 
policy response, can have major effects on output 
unnecessary economic ﬂ  uctuations. Speciﬁ  cally, 
responding to exuberance in the housing market, or 
in any sector, may come at the cost of the stability of 
economic activity and inﬂ  ation. An important limitation 
of this analysis is that while it models a buildup of 
mortgage debt, it does not capture the possibility that 
such a buildup could later unwind in ways that cause 
damage to the ﬁ  nancial system and the economy—
i.e., a “boom-bust cycle.” It therefore understates the 
beneﬁ  ts of restraining this type of buildup.
When ﬁ  nancial imbalances come from
a speciﬁ  c sector (e.g., housing), 
regulation targeted to that sector can 
be effective, while leaning with mon-
etary policy would generate unnecessary 
economic ﬂ  uctuations.
Exuberance in the Banking Sector
This section presents a contrasting illustration where, 
at least in principle, monetary policy could play a 
useful role in dealing with ﬁ  nancial imbalances, even 
when a prudential instrument is also available. In the 
example presented, ﬁ  nancial imbalances emanate 
from the banking sector, and the available prudential 
tool is a broad-based, counter-cyclical capital require-
ment that reacts to deviations of actual aggregate 
bank credit from its trend value. The example is also 
relevant to analyzing one element of the recent crisis, 
the importance of excessive banking system leverage 
in transmitting ﬁ  nancial stress during the crisis.
In the model used, from Meh and Moran (2010), the 
condition of bank balance sheets is determined 
endogenously and has important economic implica-
tions. The key innovation of this model is in capturing 
the role of bank capital in the ampliﬁ  cation and propa-
gation of shocks. The model incorporates several 
nominal and real frictions, in the spirit of state-of-the-
art New Keynesian models.
At the heart of the model is an optimal conﬁ  guration 
of ﬁ  nancial contracts under asymmetric information, 
building on the seminal work of Holmström and Tirole 
(1997). Banks intermediate funds between dispersed 
investors, who are the ultimate lenders, and ﬁ  rms, 
who are the ultimate borrowers and producers of 
capital goods. A key function of banks is to monitor 
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for the entire economy.
The second result is that monetary policy can be used 
not only to stabilize inﬂ  ation and output, but also to 
mitigate the effects of ﬁ  nancial imbalances on bank 
lending. This can be seen in Chart 3, when monetary 
policy is adjusted to counter such imbalances, but 
regulation is not. When monetary policy reacts to both 
inﬂ  ation and the output gap, bank lending is dampened 
by up to 10 per cent, and monetary policy is able to 
reduce the ﬂ  uctuations in inﬂ  ation and output. When 
the policy rate also reacts explicitly to credit, the 
increase in bank lending that results from the exuber-
ance in the banking sector is even smaller, and inﬂ  a-
tion and output are further stabilized. Thus, in this 
example, monetary policy can help to dampen the 
and inﬂ  ation, as well as on bank lending. In particular, 
it leads to important ﬂ  uctuations in inﬂ  ation and 
output. This can be seen in the case where monetary 
policy is exogenous and the capital requirement is 
constant. As illustrated in Chart 3, the exuberance in 
the banking sector leads to increases of up to 16 per 
cent in lending, 3 per cent in output, and 0.2 per cent 
in inﬂ  ation. Nominal wage rigidities induce inertia in 
inﬂ  ation and thus limit the increase in inﬂ  ation.
5 
Developments in the banking sector spill over to the 
whole economy because of the banking sector’s 
important role in ﬁ  nancing the production of the 
investment good in the model economy. Thus, a rise 
in the availability of bank credit increases the amount 
5  The real side of the model is based on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). 
Chart 3:  Effects of a positive 5 per cent shock to bank capital with no counter-cyclical capital requirement
Percentage deviation from steady state
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such ﬁ  nancial imbalances. Note also that, in the 
model economy, forward-looking and rational agents 
are aware that the central bank will increase the 
policy rate in the wake of exuberance in the banking 
sector; as a result, they limit their borrowing and 
this, in turn, leads to a smaller increase in interest 
rates (the expectations channel). Moreover, for this 
example, the steady-state level of the capital require-
ment is equal to 0.10, and the counter-cyclical capital 
requirement changes over a range of plus or minus 
2 percentage points around this steady state.
In this example, ﬁ  nancial imbalances have signiﬁ  cant 
aggregate effects on the economy, and the available 
prudential policy is relatively broad based. In such a 
case, prudential policy may not be sufﬁ  cient, and 
effects of ﬁ  nancial imbalances without diluting the 
price-stability objective or creating large losses in 
output. This is consistent with the standard result that 
monetary policy should respond pre-emptively to 
developments that affect output and inﬂ  ation.
The third ﬁ  nding is that regulation in the form of a 
counter-cyclical capital requirement contributes to 
further attenuate the ﬂ  uctuations in inﬂ  ation and 
output (Chart 4); alone, it is not as effective as mon-
etary policy. In fact, when dealing with these types of 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances, a counter-cyclical capital 
requirement and monetary policy complement each 
other. For instance, in the presence of a counter-
cyclical capital regulation, a smaller increase in the 
interest rate relative to the case with no counter-
cyclical capital requirement is needed to stabilize 
Chart 4:  Effects of a positive 5 per cent shock to bank capital with a counter-cyclical capital requirement present
Percentage deviation from steady state










20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Exogenous monetary policy rule
Taylor rule augmented with bank lending
Taylor rule
Quarters










20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Exogenous monetary policy rule












20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Exogenous monetary policy rule














20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Exogenous monetary policy rule




SHOULD MONETARY POLICY BE USED TO COUNTERACT FINANCIAL IMBALANCES?
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW     SUMMER 2010imbalances would cause inﬂ  ation to deviate from the 
target for some time and could undermine the cred-
ibility of the inﬂ  ation objective.
This does not necessarily mean that monetary policy 
should not be used. But a trade-off arises: inﬂ  ation 
rises above the target in the short run even if one tool 
does a better job of hitting the inﬂ  ation target in the 
long run. Because of modelling challenges, the simple 
models considered in this article ignore the crisis 
dynamics that could result from a persistent buildup 
of imbalances in one sector. As the recent crisis made 
clear, however, imbalances in one sector can indeed 
eventually crash and spill over into the entire economy. 
Responding to sector-speciﬁ  c imbalances can (and 
should) be justiﬁ  ed by a desire to stabilize the aggre-
gate economy. Whether the resulting reduction in 
output and inﬂ  ation is acceptable would depend on 
the success of such an action in helping to prevent a 
crisis down the road.
But a trade-off arises: inﬂ  ation rises 
above the target in the short run even 
if one tool does a better job of hitting 
the inﬂ  ation target in the long run. 
Does a well-targeted prudential tool 
obviate the need for monetary policy 
action?
One critical determinant of the appropriate monetary 
policy response to ﬁ  nancial imbalances, evident in the 
ﬁ  rst example, is the availability of alternative pruden-
tial policy instruments that can address such market 
failures at their root. It is thus important to ask how 
effective targeted prudential policies are likely to be.
Since imbalances can potentially arise in many areas 
of the ﬁ  nancial system, not one, but a whole array of 
prudential tools may be required to target them. The 
effectiveness of such tools can change over time: 
given the ability of ﬁ  nancial markets to adapt quickly 
to a changing environment (including by circumventing 
existing regulation), the tools would themselves need 
to adapt. Moreover, the authorities responsible for 
supervision and regulation would require the scope 
to adjust the parameters of their policies to target 
emerging ﬁ  nancial imbalances. In practice, such use 
of prudential policies may be constrained by the 
need to maintain a stable regulatory environment for 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and markets; the desire to create 
monetary policy has an important role to play in 
leaning against these ﬁ  nancial imbalances. Prudential 
policy and monetary policy are therefore comple-
mentary tools to stabilize economic activity and 
reduce the effects of the ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
When Should Monetary Policy 
Lean against Financial 
Imbalances?
The two examples just discussed, while quite simpli-
ﬁ  ed, serve to illustrate the point that the appropriate 
response of monetary policy to ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
depends on the nature of the imbalances, as well as 
on the alternative policy instruments available. By 
comparing the distinguishing features of the two 
examples, it is possible to go further to identify some 
factors that inﬂ  uence whether monetary policy should 
play such a role in practice.
Is the blunt nature of monetary policy a 
deﬁ  nitive argument against leaning?
As mentioned in the introduction, one argument 
against using monetary policy to lean against ﬁ  nan-
cial imbalances is that it is too blunt an instrument. 
The logic behind this argument can be seen in the 
ﬁ  rst example, where ﬁ  nancial imbalances are con-
tained within a speciﬁ  c sector and do not have a 
signiﬁ  cant short-run impact on the aggregate 
economy. Responding with monetary policy will 
  generate a material reduction in output and inﬂ  ation. 
In that sense, monetary policy is a blunt tool.
But the second case provides a counter-example. It 
suggests that if the imbalance has a material aggre-
gate economic impact, monetary policy may be 
effective in countering it. Moreover, if the alternative 
prudential tool is broad based in nature, it could be 
equally blunt. In that case, the bluntness argument 
applies to both monetary policy and prudential policy, 
and therefore bluntness may not be a strong argu-
ment against using monetary policy to lean against 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
An interesting case arises when the ﬁ  nancial imbal-
ances are such that they have a negligible impact on 
the aggregate economy in the short run, as in the ﬁ  rst 
example, and when the only available prudential tool 
is broad based (and, hence, not well targeted to the 
sources of the imbalances). This is a case in which 
both monetary policy and the prudential tool are blunt 
instruments, and their use to counter ﬁ  nancial 
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the effectiveness of regulation in achieving system-
wide objectives. These are important challenges, 
and the conﬁ  guration of prudential tools that are 
used will necessarily reﬂ  ect various compromises. In 
most cases, the goal of keeping things sufﬁ  ciently 
straightforward and manageable will likely lead to a 
set of simple and stable tools. Moreover, because 
the objective is to smooth the ﬁ  nancial cycle as a 
whole, the prudential instruments would need to be 
applied broadly to ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and markets 
across the whole ﬁ  nancial system. There will also be 
a range of instruments and policies, some directed at 
ﬁ  nancial institutions (such as capital requirements) 
and others at markets (such as haircuts). Despite this 
diversity, it is unlikely that these instruments can be 
ﬁ  ne-tuned to fully address imbalances emerging in 
particular ﬁ  nancial sectors and markets.
Prudential tools are a very important addition to the 
policy toolkit, and policy-makers must devote the 
energy required to developing them. Yet, although 
prudential tools will be always helpful to prevent and 
address ﬁ  nancial imbalances, they might not be suf-
ﬁ  cient in every case. The extent to which monetary 
policy will play a role in mitigating ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
is not clear yet, but it should be an important part of 
the discussions concerning potential improvements 
to monetary policy frameworks.
Features Absent from the Models: 
What Are the Likely Implications?
The two examples discussed here are instructive, but 
they do not include all the features that might be 
important to the question under discussion. Some of 
the missing features, such as the absence of boom-
bust dynamics in asset prices and ﬁ  nancial variables, 
were discussed in the previous section. Two addi-
tional important elements should be highlighted: (i) the 
risk-taking channel of monetary policy and (ii) the 
possibility that ﬁ  nancial imbalances may not be 
detected in time.
The risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy
It is possible that small changes in the policy rate 
might have a much larger effect than assumed in the 
examples considered. This is particularly the case 
when the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is 
present. It has been argued that the stance of mon-
etary policy may itself lead to excessive risk taking 
by economic agents, which, in turn, can lead to ﬁ  nan-
cial instability. In particular, some observers (such as 
White 2006, 2009) have argued that interest rates that 
were kept too low for too long were an important 
factor in setting the stage for the 2007–09 crisis.
Speciﬁ  cally, monetary policy could inﬂ  uence the 
degree of risk that ﬁ  nancial institutions decide to 
bear by inﬂ  uencing their perception and pricing of risk 
(Adrian and Shin 2009; Borio and Zhu 2008). This can 
take place through three broad types of mechanisms: 
(i) the perceived predictability of monetary policy, 
(ii) the search for yield, and (iii) the insurance effect of 
monetary policy. The ﬁ  rst two mechanisms incite 
more risk taking in a low-interest-rate environment, 
while the third provides incentives for ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions to take more risks through the moral hazard 
created by the authorities’ perceived reaction func-
tion. These three mechanisms can lead ﬁ  nancial insti-
tutions and economic agents to take on too much 
leverage and the associated maturity mismatches, 
which, in turn, can generate ﬁ  nancial imbalances. 
While there is some empirical evidence suggesting 
that such effects may have been at play prior to the 
recent crisis, the quantitative importance of the risk-
taking channel remains largely unclear. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that the risk-taking channel is operative, 
it implies that the stance of monetary policy may 
contribute to excessive risk-taking behaviour and to 
the buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances. This would 
strengthen the case for leaning against ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances with monetary policy.
Monetary policy could inﬂ  uence the 
degree of risk that ﬁ  nancial institutions 
decide to bear by inﬂ  uencing their
perception and pricing of risk.
What if ﬁ  nancial imbalances cannot 
be detected?
As mentioned in the introduction, one important argu-
ment against using monetary policy as a tool in these 
situations is that ﬁ  nancial imbalances cannot be 
detected with certainty. This uncertainty applies not 
only to monetary policy, but also to prudential policy, 
and should play a role in determining how forcefully to 
react to the prospect of building ﬁ  nancial imbalances.
Recent research at the Bank for International 
Settlements shows that our ability to detect imbal-
ances may have improved. In any case, because we 
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Literature Cited
As stressed in this article, a monetary policy that 
leans against the buildup of ﬁ  nancial imbalances is 
not inherently inconsistent with a ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation-
targeting regime.
7 Such ﬂ  exibility can be expressed in 
terms of a longer target horizon (Basant Roi and 
Mendes 2007; Selody and Wilkins 2007). In practice, 
however, exercising this ﬂ  exibility could be challenging 
(Carney 2008, 2009). The examples presented in this 
article—and the subsequent discussion of some of 
the factors that are not included in them—highlight 
the complexities involved in characterizing the appro-
priate role of monetary policy in a setting where such 
imbalances may arise.
Much more work will be needed to bring our under-
standing of these issues to the level required to clarify 
the implications for the monetary policy framework. 
This will include further conceptual work on the types 
of imbalances that may emerge, the crises that may 
occur when the imbalances unravel, and the inﬂ  uence 
of monetary and prudential policies on the probability 
and severity of such crises. It will also include empir-
ical work on the importance of various shocks and on 
the strength of the relevant macroeconomic linkages. 
Finally, there will also be a need to work through the 
operational implications of implementing such a 
monetary policy.
7  See Bank of Canada (2006) for the background document on the 2006 renewal of the 
inﬂ  ation-control target.
are confronted with irreducible, or Knightian, uncer-
tainty (Lo and Muller 2010) does not mean that such a 
prospect should be ignored. If we were interested in 
conducting monetary policy in a robust fashion—that 
is, trying to avoid worst-case outcomes rather than 
achieving the optimum—the probability, even if 
unquantiﬁ  able, of a ﬁ  nancial imbalance building 
would call for some monetary policy response.
6 This 
response could also be justiﬁ  ed in a risk-management 
framework.
Conclusion
In this article, we have argued that the case for mon-
etary policy to lean against ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
depends on the sources of the shock or market failure 
and on the nature of the other regulatory instruments 
available. To the extent that ﬁ  nancial imbalances are 
speciﬁ  c to a sector and that a well-targeted prudential 
tool is available, monetary policy would play a minor 
role in leaning against the imbalances. However, if the 
imbalances in a speciﬁ  c market can spill over to the 
entire economy and if the prudential tool is broad 
based, monetary policy will likely have a role to play. 
In this case, there may be a need to coordinate the 
use of the two policy instruments.
6  The literature on “robust control” may provide some valuable insights in this regard 
(Hansen and Sargent 2001, 2008).
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